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SUMMARY
The purpose of this paper is to consider the legal ramifications 
which are thrown up once there is a contract in place between the host 
state and an oil company for the exploration and exploitation of its 
oil resources and a massive change in the pricing structure occurs.
The specific area of concern is the contractual obligations in 
relation to the drilling of exploratory wells in the work programme 
which in most cases constitute a basic term of the contract and which 
under the United Kingdom petroleum regime is considered a precondition 
to the grant of a licence to explore and exploit the oil resources. 
The discussion is centred around the U.K. petroleum arrangements 
mainly because former British Colonies including Trinidad and Tobago 
which are oil producers have relied upon the U.K. regime as a working 
model.
It is being argued that the petroleum "contract" has undergone 
changes overtime unlike a contract in classical terms, moving away 
from the concept of a grant of a "concession" or "licence" to the 
foreign oil companies, who held the balance of the power because of 
their massive capital and technology, to the notion of the modern day 
governmental contract where, although its legal nature is 
controversial, its effect is essentially a mutual economic arrangement 
under which the foreign oil companies' profit expectations are 
balanced by the host states' interest in achieving maximum economic 
benefits for its oil resources in the national interest. In addition, 
the agreement is being concluded against a very complex background of
(iii)
inter alia emerging international legal norms and principles 
respecting permanent sovereignty over natural resources and a new 
international economic order, an unregulated international oil market 
as well as diverse political and social factors.
The central issue is whether in the changed economic conditions 
brought on by the recent oil price collapse the oil companies can 
claim a right to renegotiate the contract in relation to the work 
obligations in the work programme in order to secue their profit 
expectations whether or not a stipulation for renegotiation exists in 
the contract. Related issues concern the general nature and legal 
nature of the petroleum contract concluded between a state party and 
private companies and the general nature and legal nature of the 
concept of force majeure and whether such a concept is applicable in 
the case where some oil companies have claimed that the drilling 
obligations have become too onerous because of the drastic price fall.
Finally, it is being contended that in the complex oil industry 
the future would reveal shifts in the balance of power with the 
foreign investors claiming increased rights inter alia the right to 
renegotiate the work programme when economic conditions have changed 
and which would most certainly impact upon the British law and 
practice that at present, in certain respects, operate contrary to 
international practice in the oil industry.
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Chapter 1
The Changing Contractual Patterns of Petroleum Agreements
1
The blame for the oil price collapse in 1986 has been placed 
squarely on the policy of the Saudi Arabian faction of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which aimed at 
engaging itself in a search for new ways for increasing their 
bargaining strength and share in the world market by overproduction 
and the consequent driving down of the oil price.-*- The result was a 
dramatic change in the price of oil which fell from its peak price of 
over $40 a barrel in 1980-81 to a very low $10 a barrel and even lower 
m  what has been described as "the price cut that went too far". 
This event has brought into focus contractual issues regarding the 
binding nature of those agreements which the oil companies have 
entered into under the terms of the licence to exploit the oil 
resources in a producer country. The contraction of the cash flow 
brought on by the fall in oil prices has caused some companies to 
embark on programmes that were contrary to the terms of the licence. 
Some companies in the U.K. were reported to have sought relief from 
drilling "obligation wells" that is, those wells to which they were 
committed under the terms of the licence and the report claimed, while 
some of the requests were entertained, the Department of Energy would 
not encourage such practice. ^ In as much as the nature of petroleum 
agreements is based essentially on profit-oriented undertakings by oil 
companies and governments as parties events such as the recent oil 
price collapse illustrate the changing nature of relationships between 
contract law in the classical sense, based on the notion that parties 
are assumed to have equal bargainaing strength and are endowed with 
complete freedom of decision, and its political and economic 
environment.
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The heart of the contract between a state and an oil company for 
the exploration and exploitation of its oil resources lies in the idea 
of an agreement. The notion of equal bargaining strength of the 
parties to such an agreement needs to be questioned. Initially, the 
state is the weaker party and in most instances has no real option but 
to agree because it lacks either technology, expertise or capital 
which the transnational oil companies can provide. Once an agreement 
is made, however, a shift of bargaining strength occurs and the state 
becomes the stronger partner because concepts such as sovereignty and 
national interests, for example, come to its assistance.
The idea that the parties to a petroleum contract intend to 
create binding relationships in the strict classical sense is 
misplaced. One important consideration is that the main oil exporters 
outside the Soviet Union and Britain are developing countries whose 
recent claims to a new international economic order in which concepts 
of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources^ assume inter 
alia that the state may radically alter its contractual commitments 
with foreign private enterprises. The United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution No. 2158(XXI) on Permanent Sovereignty over natural 
resources (1966) at paragraph 5 recognizes the right of producing 
countries "to have a greater share in the advantages and profits" 
derived from their natural resources "on an equitable basis". One 
writer5 has viewed this paragraph as an indirect endorsement of the 
concept of mutual equivalence of contractual advantages. The effort, 
however, to reestablish the "equitable basis" for relations between 
producing countries and foreign concessionary companies admits that 
petroleum contracts are subject to change and evidently the classical 
notion of strict binding relationships in the petroleum agreement from
the view of the developing country oil exporter is contrary to its 
interests. Developinjcountries argue that petroleum contracts are 
concluded with governments and involve the exploitation of a major 
natural resource which is bound up with the strategies of the country 
therefore there is need to expand contract law beyond its technical 
features in order to include a more general concern with the 
development needs of the country.8 Both the U.K. and Norwegian 
legislations governing oil production have emphasised that oil 
exploitation must coincide with the national interests. Nevertheless, 
developed countries have always opposed the developing countries' idea 
of a new international economic order. In the Texaco Overseas 
Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. the Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic (Texaco) the arbitrator, Dupuy, analyzed the 
voting pattern of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions
- 3171 (XXVIII) 1973, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
(PSNR)8;
- 3201 (S-VI) 1974, Declaration on the Establishment of a New
Q
International Economic Order (NIEO)^ ;
- 3281 (XXIX) 1974, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States (CERDS)10
and concluded that 3171 (PSNR) and 3281 (CERDS) lacked support from 
the overwhelming majority of Western countries while 3201 (NIEO), 
although adopted by formal 'consensus' was challenged in its 'legal 
validity' by a number of substantial reservations stipulated by these 
countries. The developed countries' argument is that the principles 
underlying the new international economic order suppose on break from
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traditional legal concepts inter alia the concept of pacta sunt 
servanda therefore they claim that such principles do not form part of 
customary international law. Developing countries on the other hand 
were vigorously challenging the old order with concepts of equity and 
the principle of rebus sic stantibus (changed circumstances).
Quite apart from the legal issues, however, reference must also
be made to political and economic factors which serve to undermine the
principle of binding relations in any strict sense. A brief look at
some of the claims and interests nationally as well as internationally
would illustrate this point. The interests of the producer-state
revolve around policies concerning the regulation and conservation of
its resources; a share of oil revenues, the supply of oil for domestic
market and the employment for domestic industry. There is also the
consumer state's interest in the stability of supply at prices it can
afford. The international community's interest may lie in freedom of
trade and navigation and freedom of pollution.-^ A common feature of
petroleum legal arrangements is that they provide for changes albeit
through negotiations so that to regard petroleum arrangements as being
12legally binding in nature strictly speaking may be quite misleading.
The petroleum agreement therefore must be considered in 
conjunction with several claims and interests which are essentially 
political and economic factors and which result in changes in its 
terms throughout the life of the agreement itself. These factors have 
always influenced the shape that these agreements take since the 
William Knox D'Arcy Concession in Persia (Islamic Republic of Iran) in 
1901. Some description is being made of the changes that have taken 
place over time and which have culminated in the modern legal 
frameworks, such as the "licence", which to all intents and purposes
are regarded as a contract between the producer state and the oil 
company for the exploration and exploitation of oil.
Traditionally the substantial capital that is a prerequisite for 
petroleum development was provided by the multinational oil companies 
within a legal framework known as the "concession" which was generally 
recorded in simple documents and included terms and conditions which 
T'fsulted in effective control by the companies of the entire range of 
petroleum activities. Some principal conditions were:
a) Large areas with no relinquishment provisions;
b) Long concession periods up to 99 years;
c) No state participation in management;
d) Royalty paid on production tonnage;
e) Exclusive rights granted to the company to all facets of
petroleum activities;
f) contractual provisions guaranteed for the duration of the
13concession.
In the past the oil companies were assured of uninhibited 
exploitation of massive oil reserves until in some cases the early 
twenty-first century without having to renegotiate the contract. Where 
the host state attempted to renegotiate or unilaterally altered 
applicable laws the oil companies would claim that the host state had 
acted illegally by 'breach' of the contract and would demand immediate 
restitution of any resulting loss of bargain by resorting to public 
international legal rules in the field of 'state contracts'.
Asante^ is of the view that on an ideological level this regime 
represented the classical nineteenth century doctrine of 'freedom of
6
contract' by which the parties to a contract would be regarded as 
possessing equal bargaining power and that once they had made their 
bargain the law should not upset it because it would upset the most 
efficient principle of resource allocation, namely, the free market. 
While this philosophy was a useful device for legitimating the 
extremely favourable terms that the oil companies had gained under the 
old oil concessions, it is undeniable that in real terms any notion of 
equal bargaining power with regard to the parties in petroleum 
agreements with developing countries then, as now, is completely 
misplaced. The state therefore exercised no real voice in either the 
management or the conduct of petroleum operations and could not 
participate in profits, either inside or outside the country, apart 
from royalty payment based on the tonnage of the crude oil produced 
rather than on its value. Inevitably disputes arose and the state
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began to assert its legislative and executive powers. By 1957 the 
dominance of the oil companies was being threatened - Mexico had 
expropriated the domestic assets of foreign oil companies in 1938 and 
created PERMEX, a national oil company. In 1948 Venezeula enacted 
legislation taxing companies' profits at the rate of 50 per cent. 
Saudi Arabia, in 1950, took advantage of U.S. tax laws which allowed 
foreign income tax payments to be creditable against U.S. tax 
liabilities and imposed its own 50 per cent tax and as a consequence 
doubled company payments to itself. Ihe shift from royalty to income 
tax had begun to take place. Further, the massive expansion of world­
wide petroleum exploration resulted in the emergence of hundreds of 
new companies and entities and rapid development of new countractual 
arrangements to replace traditional concession agreements. These had 
been modified to include royalty (generally 12*5 per cent of gross
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production and which was either credited or expensed against a net
income tax of 50 per cent), a shorter exploration period of 25 to 30
years, a minimum exploration expenditure, stricter relinquishment
1 fiprovisions and the training and employment of national personnel.
The period 1957 to 1966 marked the beginning of the first joint- 
venture agreements and production-sharing contracts and was 
characterised by an increasingly active state role in the conduct of 
oil operations based on its right to intervene founded upon the notion 
of sovereignty. The profound discontent with the inequitable situation 
that existed between oil producing countries and the concessionaires 
showed itself in the Iranian nationalisation of the oil industry in 
1951 (though later forced to be reversed by an oil embargo) so that 
continued foreign operations had to be permitted under a concession 
regime. The result was the joint-venture agreement between the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Italian State Company 
(AGIP SpA) 1957. Some principal features were:
a) NIOC and AGIP were both represented on the Board of Directors;
b) The duration of the agreement was limited to 25 years;
c) AGIP obligated itself to a firm spending commitment during the
exploration period, with reimbursement only in the event of
a commercial discovery;
d) Development and exploitation costs would be borne equally by
NIOC and AGIP;
e) AGIP was subject to a royalty of 12 per cent calculated on the
posted price and a 50 per cent tax on net income after
17deducation of the royalty paid.
Two points are worth mentioning. First, the state company became 
an important instrument in increasing the host country's equity 
position in the joint-venture agreements. Secondly, although income 
tax became a main source of revenue royalties have not disappeared but 
the shift away from royalties to some form of income taxation allowed 
the host government to collect two types of levy. Royalties in 
practice have seldom represented any significant portion of actual 
company profits.
A significant development during this period was the formation of
1 Q
OPEC in 1961 by Venezeula, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Iraq. The 
immediate cause of the formation of OPEC was not to obtain an 
advantage but rather to use the oil weapon in furtherance of a 
political aim, namely to ensure that the unilateral action of the oil 
companies in price-setting would not be repeated. Therefore some of 
the main goals were to maintain prices in a falling market and to 
change the margins of surplus and shortage by controlling the rates of 
production, in part through the imposition of royalties and 
taxation. Whether OPEC can be classified as a classic cartel is an 
academic exercise outside the scope of this work but it undoubtedly 
represented a collective effort by powerful producer states determined 
to maximise their economic advantages and in the past had been largely 
successful in securing higher prices and more favourable contract 
conditions.
The first petroleum production-sharing contract dates from the 
Independent Indonesian American Petroleum Company (Iiapco) 1966. The 
Indonesian government's position was that it would retain ownership of 
the oil and be responsible for the overall management of operations. 
Secondly, it was felt that a division of production would replace the
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pricing basis of profit-sharing. This development has had a great 
impact on the structure of transnational petroleum arrangements since 
a large number of oil producing countries has adopted this form.
The legal structure of the Indonesian production-sharing
arrangements, however, was altered after the 1976 U.S. tax ruling
which stated that the share of production retained by the Indonesian
government via Pertamina (its state oil company) was in effect a
royalty and could not qualify as a foreign tax credit applicable to
income tax of U.S. corporations. Additionally, since the contractor
(the U.S. corporation) did not have a legal title to the production it
could not claim foreign tax liability on production it did not own.
Therefore, in attempting to comply, the modern contracts stipulate
that "both partners" (Pertamina and the foreign company) are to carry
out all operations as a "Joint Operation" with obligation jointly to
participate in the costs and rights under the contract, each holding
50 per cent participatory interest share in the contract and for that
20purpose an additional "Operating Agreement" was signed.
Some features of interest are:
a) The Foreign Company (contractor) shall be the Operator;
b) Operations shall be approved by the Operating Committee
comprised of one representative of each party and decisions 
are binding;
c) Exploration efforts must have been conducted by the Foreign
Company in the Contract Area at an agreed cost prior to the 
effective date of the contract;
d) Development of fields can be undertaken jointly or singly but
where undertaken jointly each party shall be entitled to
10
production in proportion to its Participating Interest in 
the production-sharing contract;
e) The contract period is 30 years but if no petroleum is
discovered within 6 years in the Contract Area, the contract 
shall be terminated in its entirety.
f) The Foreign Company pays compensation and Production Bonus as
well as stipulated sums calculated on daily production from 
the Contract Area.
It should be mentioned that the production-sharing contract 
allows many variations, for example the "production split". This can 
be a 50 per cent government and oil company split as used in Peru. The 
variation is not as striking as it may seem for the oil company is 
subject to income tax on its share and regardless of the split the 
rate of return to the oil company can be controlled by varying tax 
rates. There is also the "cost recovery1 variety as used in Indonesia 
where the first 40 per cent of production would go to the contractor 
to cover costs but the percentage varies in other countries. Since 
each nation has its own special needs the form of production-sharing 
contracts has important variations around the w o r l d . " 2 2
Another significant type of contractual development is the 
service contract which can be either risk service contract or non-risk 
service contract. The risk service contract came into being in the 
1970's. It contains all the usual elements, such as duration, work 
obligations, with production-sharing contracts but its basic 
distinctive feature is that if pays the oil company in cash, not in 
crude oil although it may provide permission for the oil company to 
buy back an amount of crude at internatlonial prices from established.
production. The contractor undertakes all risk and investment and 
provides capital for exploration and production. If discovery is made 
the contractor places it on stream but thereafter it is operated by 
the state or the contractor. Capital is reimbursed with interest and a 
risk fee. Taxes are paid by the contractor on his earnings. Brazil 
uses this type of contract. 25
The non-risk type is a pure service contract of work where the 
contractor is paid a flat fee for his services e.g. Aramco in Saudi 
Arabia (1980) where the net fee is 15 cents a barrel (plus inflation) 
after tax. Exploration is also carried out and the risk is rewarded 
with additional crude from reserves found plus an additional 6 cents 
per barrel on new oil. This type of contract is subject to general 
corporate taxation but not to higher special petroleum taxes. Further, 
there are two categories of service contracts that is, those which run 
parallel but contractually unconnected with a purchase contract for 
part of the oil produced in the contract area, and secondly, those not 
accompanied by any access to the oil being produced under the 
contract.^
Although the pattern of contractual development cannot be 
assigned to precise periods the period 1966 to 1980 was marked by the 
emergence of the fully active controlling role played by the oil 
producing states. The principal device through which such control has 
been exercised is the service contract but even where other forms of 
contracts were used the period since 1966 has seen a marked advance in 
the extent to which the host government can control the petroleum 
sector and in the revenues accruing to the host country from petroleum 
production.25 One writer has thus summed up the situation:
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"The last twenty years have been a major upheaval 
in the oil industry ... dramatic changes in the 
commercial and legal relationships between 
producer states and major or independent oil 
companies have transformed the position of these 
companies from one of apparently secure access to 
ample long-term supplies of crude to one of 
scrambling for exiguous supplies from the national 
oil company of producer states on short-term 
contracts."28
The full significance of the legal transformation from concession
to contract has been recently questioned on the ground that despite
the world-wide trend toward contractual arrangements the concession
system is still widely used under different names such as "licence" in
the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia and Trinidad and Tobago to name
a few countries. The distinction of "traditional" concession and
97"modern" concession has been suggested as being more appropriate.
It is nevertheless agreed that the modern type was mainly influenced 
by the increased state participation in the ownership of the 
enterprise and the insistence by producing states on a greater role in 
managing the extractive operation.
Some writers argue that the concession should be seen as a 
"process in which the bargaining powers and interests change over 
time".28 Yet another is of the view that it is impossible to draw any 
distinction between concession and contract because whatever terms and 
conditions provide "the ultimate success of the venture will depend 
upon the ability of its managers to dispose of oil in the
13
international markets."29 He notes:
"Both concenssions and contracts result from
agreements between governments and foreign
investors. In both cases, the essential purpose is
the same - to regulate the terms upon which a
foreign investor is to operate in the territory
that is under the jurisdiction of the government
party. Both result in the granting of rights to
the foreign investor by the government and in the
assumption by the foreign investor of obligations
30towards the govenment."
The legal debate over the evolution of the concession may 
continue but clearly it will be fallacious to dispute that political 
and economic factors gave rise to changes in the attitudes of the
producer states which were in turn reflected in the agreements that
they concluded with the oil companies. It has been observed:
"The former legal security of the companies, based
on the device of the long-term concession, has not 
withstood the weapons of renegotiation and 
unilateral variation (whether of the concession 
itself or of its surrounding legal framework) 
deployed by producer governments in their struggle 
to derive greater advantage from the exploitation 
of the crude oil resources."31
The modern petroleum contract must necessarily be viewed in a
14
global context which has also been extremely complex over time. 
Petroleum development is important both for governments who are either 
importers or producers/exporters and who have constantly to identify 
the role of law and seek to prevent and resolve the conflicts that are 
bound to arise. For the producer states the main actors are the 
multinational oil companies and for such governments the law and 
policy are tied up with:
"... rapid and thorough exploration of prospective 
areas, the effective development of, and maximum 
ultimate recovery from, reservoirs which are 
discovered and maximisation of benefit to the
on
national economy from such developments."-3,6
The multinational's principal objective of maximisation of its 
long-run earnings from its overall global operations determines its 
global exploration strategy. When a multinational engages in a 
petroleum contract with a producer state it, no doubt, has an interest 
in exploration and making a commercial discovery. But there could be 
basic divergencies between the government and the companies on a whole 
range of issues. Therefore the legal arrangements usually provide for 
consulations to take place before decisions are taken on the various 
stages of operations, namely, exploration, development, production and
'i'l
marketing.
The divergence of interests between producer states and oil 
companies has been recently demonstrated in the British petroleum 
sector when at the company's annual general meeting the Chairman of 
British Petroleum (BP) urged the government to consider a tax cut on 
the companies' production profits to prevent North Sea oilfields
15
developments from drying up as a result of the recent fall in the oil 
prices. He stressed that "if a more appropriate tax system" was not 
arrived at new investment in the North Sea will be prevented. The 
government, on the other hand, while expressing concern about a 
possible slump in new North Sea developments, initially stated that it 
was not prepared to cut Petroleum Tax (currently at 75%) on the 
argument that a cut would reduce its own take but would not 
necessarily lead to a greater North Sea investment because the "oil 
companies could direct the extra cash to any of their operations 
worldwide.
The majors or the long-established oil companies like BP tend to 
be concerned with their long-term position in the oil industry and are 
primarily interested in the discovery of oilfields that are capable of 
making a significant contribution to the companies' worldwide needs 
for supplying their own downstream operations. Consequently, their 
main interest is in the export of petroleum produced. On the other 
hand the large independent oil companies such as Phillips, Occidental 
or Conoco, for example, tend to have less fully integrated worldwide 
operations and would thus be less concerned than the majors with 
assuring their own crude oil supplies and as such would be more 
amenable to accommodate the concerns of developing countries while at 
the same time challenge the majors' traditional control over the 
world's main oil producing areas. In 1970, for example, Occidental 
agreed to terms with Libya which were significantly more favourable 
than those applying in the major's concession in the Middle East. The 
smaller independents have tended to concentrate their foreign 
operations in a few countries and are more willing to explore in areas
16
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where only small or medium sized fields are likely to be found.
It is against such background of varied conflicts of interests 
added to the proliferation of agreements and legislations that one has 
to seek and assess the role of law in which international economic 
relations in the petroleum sector fall to be regulated.
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Petroleum Revenue Tax Act 1986 {1986 c. 68) .
35* UM Doc. ST/CTC/43 op. cit. p. 9.
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Chapter 2
The Legal Nature of the Petroleum Contract: The Issue of 
the Collapse in the Oil Prices
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The Third World claim of a right of permanent sovereignty over 
their natural resources whether oil or any other resource is intended 
to establish political control over exploitation in order to ensure 
maximum benefits for the host country from use of a non-renewable 
asset. Therefore the state's wish is to have freedom to vary the 
contractual terms of petroleum agreements when it considers that the 
public interest demands variation. Co-existing with this ideology is 
the aim of the foreign corporation to protect not only the investments 
it has made in the host country but also to secure its profit 
expectations based on the contract. A fundamental and recurring 
problem is how to reconcile two legitimate needs namely, flexibility 
and stability, in the contractual arrangements. The consequences of 
this problem have in the past produced the well known confrontations 
between the producer states and the transnational companies and the 
subsequent changes in the substance and structure of the petroleum 
agreement. The recent collapse in the oil price may again produce 
tensions leading to changes in the agreement only this time the signal 
for change would come from the oil companies rather than the producer 
states. Interestingly, the policy of strict governmental control over 
its oil resources is not restricted to the Third World. Such policy 
objective conforms with the policies adopted by some developed country 
producers. The U.K. legislation1, for example, has its base in the 
philosophy that exploration and exploitation of the oil must be in the 
national interest and asserted for the U.K. "greater public control" 
by the setting up of the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC). The 
objective is to ensure state presence as a basic feature of the 
arrangements with the private oil companies in a venture from which a
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considerable amount of the state's revenue would be derived. In this 
sense the petroleum agreement comprises certain characteristics which 
do not strictly correspond with the classical contract for it is a 
government contract with international dimensions under which complex 
issues arise and any attempt at solving such issues would demonstrate 
the inadequacy of classical contractual solutions.
Looking briefly at the legal nature of a petroleum contract it is 
to be noted that the legal status of the parties is a peculiar one. 
Generally the transnational oil company will enter into the agreement 
through an affiliate incorporated in the host country but the 
"foreign" status of the investor and the transnational character of 
the agreement are usually preserved inter alia in relation to 
questions of applicable law. One writer is of the view that in 
practice this peculiarity could present difficulties of identification 
of the investor whether foreign or local for particular purposes. 
Identification of the investor's contractual counterpart the "state" 
can also be uncertain in cases where a state uses an indirect means 
and contract through enterprises which are incorporated under public 
or private law, with their capital held by the state or other 
entities. Wolfgang Peter4 has made the point that while the state may 
be identified through its state enterprise by using various criteria 
(appearance of representation, public power prerogatives, control, 
etc.) the many different ways in which a state may be present in a 
contract still make the formal identification of the state as a 
contract partner a difficult undertaking. He therefore supports the 
view that identification of the contract partner as "state" should not 
be made in general terms but rather with regard to every particular 
legal question that arises.
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Important legal implications follow the identification of the 
state's presence in the contractual relationship e.g. the rules of law 
applicable to the contract or the problems of power prerogatives, 
immunities and responsibility. These implications vary depending upon 
whether the state is a direct partner to the contract or whether this 
role is assumed by the state enterprise. A state is subject to 
international law while a state enterprise is a corporation created by 
the state and usually governed by the state's public law. A state 
enterprise as a contract partner may create problems such as the 
question of separation between the state and its enterprise where a 
state enterprise claims force maieure in case of the state's 
intervention with the contract performance. An example is the 
Bangladesh case“* where the People's Republic of Bangladesh dissolved 
the state enterprise which resulted in the disappearance of its debts 
causing huge losses to the foreign investors.
State enterprises are a feature of both developing and developed 
countries in the petroleum sector. Both U.K. and Norway have used 
state enterprises for North Sea oil exploitation. In the U.K. the 
state remains the direct partner to the contract. State enterprises 
were created as instruments to achieve control over foreign 
investment, albeit graduallly, with the intention of reducing the 
dependence on foreign economic actors. One writer has noted that:
"National oil companies around the world have been 
created to ensure the service of domestic 
objectives on an international industry dominated 
by firms headquartered abroad".^
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However, where governments by their national oil companies sought to 
formulate policies in order to compete with existing 'majors' and thus 
operate as a source for gathering information about the workings of 
the market sucess has been limited, for, according to Daintith^ 
governments quickly found themselves presented with a dilemma: in 
order to compete on the international scene these state companies had 
themselves to become fully integrated organizations thereby 
restricting the potential for government access and influence.
The complexity of the legal nature of the state enterprise, 
however, is beyond the scope of this work nevertheless it may be 
useful to note the formulation put forward by W. Peter® thus:
"Generally a state enterprise is a public 
corporation based on a statute that describes its 
administrative and commerical autonomy as well as 
the extent and form of control exercisable over it 
by the state which has created it and which 
usually owns its entire capital."
A common difficulty with petroleum agreements is that of
classification. The development of the petroleum industry in any
particular country is done over an extended period and in different
phases or stages. The basic elements of a petroleum grant whether
labelled "concession" or "contract" may be divided up into three major
9 uphases, namely reconnaisance, exploration and exploitation , the 
latter being more frequently referred to as the production phase. This 
classification is not strict because in the myriad systems found 
around the world governments interested in roakaing the best use of 
petroleum resources may embark on diverse petroleum resource
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policies-^. Whatever arrangement is chosen to govern petroleum 
activities has, as noticed, been characterised as contractual and 
there exists abundant literature regarding the legal nature of such 
contracts^. Henry Cattan for example sees the oil concession as:
"... on the one hand ... a commercial agreement 
which defines the rights and obligations of the 
parties and regulates their relationships much in 
the same way as any other contract. On the other 
hand ... [it] possesses elements of public law 
which are inexistent in private contracts."i2
However, he concludes that the combination of features of private law 
and public law reflects
"a new orientation in the contractual relationships
between a state and a corporation ... made
necessary by the need of cooperation between the
state and private commercial interests for the
promotion of the oil industry and the exploitation
of petroleum resources in a manner which serves
the interest of the state and at the same time
13secures the rights of the concessionaire."
The complexity of defirTing the legal status of petroleum 
contracts is not made any simpler by the diversity of the many 
operations and interests involved in petroleum activities and which 
encompass the notion that each state possesses a sovereign and 
permanent right to freely dispose its natural wealth and resources in
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accordance with its national interest1  ^and to enjoy respect for its 
economic independence15. The UN General Assembly Resolution (1966) 
placed great emphasis on the right of all countries to secure and 
increase^ their, share in the administration of enterprises which are 
fully or: partly operated on their soil by foreign capital and to have 
a greater share in the benefits deriving from them on an equitable 
basis.16
The foreign companies, on the other hand, anxious to secure their
own interests and expectations, insist on inclusion in the contract
various legal techniques which tend to reinforce the general principle
of sanctity of contract. Stabilization clauses are one of the methods
frequently used. These aim at preventing the host state from altering
the terms of the concession contract and generally provide for
international arbitration. They are provisions stating simply that the
investor's rights will remain unaffected by subsequent enactments. An
17example is the Aminoil Concession with the Shaikh of Kuwait which
provided inter alia that alteration will only be made by agreement of
bbth parties. Not only contractual rights are protected by such device
18in one known case even nationalization is excluded.
Stabilization clauses may refer to the property in which case 
compensation is provided for but they may also refer to the fiscal 
regime in which case the host country would agree that the taxes, 
rates, royalties and related matters will remain invariable during the 
term of the contract. The tax system is one of the important factors 
whichr determine decisions by oil companies whether or not to operate 
iiinah^ pafticuiar area and since developing countries are usually in a 
whlikkbafgaihing position initially, they agree to stabilize their 
fiscal regimes in order to attract much needed investment. However,
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when prospects improve as a result of discoveries and developments the 
tax system becomes an important device for maximising government 
revenues and these governments then seek to tighten up the generous 
regimes. This is customary and the U.K. is no exception. In 1974 both 
Britain and Norway unilaterally altered their fiscal regimes for North 
Sea oil following the escalation of oil prices.
However, stabilisation of the fiscal regime is a feature of
petroleum agreements involving developing countries and oil 
19companies. Developed countries by contrast enter into no such 
agreement. In the case of the U.K. the notion of parliamentary 
supremacy makes any agreement to stabilise its fiscal regime 
pointless. The British position is that under its constitutional 
arrangements tax raising is a fundamental sovereign power and 
therefore the government cannot, by contract, fetter its future 
executive action which must necessarily be determined by the needs of 
the community. In other words, the British view is that in matters 
which concern the welfare of the state the government cannot contract 
to hamper its freedom of action.20 It follows therefore that oil 
companies cannot obtain British government contractual guarantees 
which would operate to bind Parliament for the future in terms of a 
specific fiscal package. The oil companies must therefore appeal to 
the British government for downward alteration of the petroleum tax 
legislation. It has been reported that oil companies in the U.K. and 
Norway have appealed to the respective govenments to ease the 
petroleum tax burdens so as to offset the effects of the low oil 
prices.21 In Norway the oil companies record that tax levels were 
raised in 1975 and 1980 to match rising prices and argued that since
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the recent prices have fallen in real terms below the 1975 level taxes
should also be reduced. The Norwegian government responded to the call
to reduce taxes. The Canadian government took the initiative and
eliminated Federal Revenue tax on oil and gas production until the end 
22of 1986 . But even in a state of sharp contraction as development
projects were being deferred and drilling rigs taken out of use the
British government's initial concern was that a cut in the Petroleum
Revenue Tax, while reducing its own take, would not necessarily lead
to greater North Sea investment.^
By contrast most petroleum agreements concluded with developing
countries contain very definite restrictions on their freedom of
action.^ It has been recently noted^ that when contracting with
developing countries the oil companies tend to ensure that once an
agreement has been reached on the fiscal regime no scrap of residual
power is left to the government to increase its share of any available
surplus by new fiscal measures not contemplated by the agreement.^
As a consequence when circumstances change developing countries are
accused of violating agreements while developed countries, with
stronger bargaining positions who do not have to accept restrictions
on their freedom of action, are not.
It could be argued that oil agreements which stabilise the fiscal
regimes of developing countries may, strictly speaking, constitute a
constitutional limitation on their powers to deal with their natural
resources and that such agreements do cut across rights of permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources that these countries are
claiming in their call for a new international economic order despite
the vigorous defensive arguments put forward by some Third World
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lawyers that such agreements are in effect exercises m  sovereignty.
30
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Kamal Hossain has reasoned that by affirming a legal policy a state 
does not intend to restrict its own freedom to contract which is also 
part of its fundamental sovereign rights. The counter argument could 
be that oil companies do not intend to dispute sovereign power rather 
their insistence on stabilising the fiscal regime must be understood 
as an indication that the contract depends on mutual expectations of 
profits thus making it quite clear that if they do not achieve their 
expectations they would not wish to continue to work.
. OQ
Muchlinski y observes that in the contemporary period the 
relationship between the oil companies and the producer state is 
characterised by an uneasy balance of power. The oil companies have 
lost their previously total control over production by the partial 
displacement of the old one-sided concession regime and the cautious 
acceptance of the state's sovereign rights to economic development 
while the producing states have lost their grip over world oil prices 
due to factors such as a glut in supplies, the development of spot 
markets and new sources of oil so that they continue to depend on the 
oil companies for distribution and sales outlets, for revenues from 
oil purchases and for co-operation over new exploration investments.
on
The effect of these changes argues MuchlinskiJU has been to claw back
the apparent gains of the producing states through their recognition
of the legitimate expectations of the company and as a consequence the
nature of the legal issues involved has changed. He notes that the
most important questions relate not to ownership but to the division
of revenues between the company and the state and these involve the
non-legal question of negotiating a level of revenue that will ensure
31economic efficiency for both parties.
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The scenario in the oil market is one of 'chaos' and it has been 
32pointed out that the central problem is that the oil agreement has 
to be made against a background of an unstable market which is not 
regulated along the lines of neo-classical economics that assume inter 
alia that buyers and sellers meet in markets that clear and operate in 
equilibrium, or that politics has little place in the market and that 
governments intrude only to overcome limited market imperfections. 
Although the strengths of this approach are inter alia that it assumes 
market logic, that is, the desire to maximise returns will in the long 
run dominate the behaviour of those involved and insists on the 
complementarity of producers and consumers, buyers and sellers, 
thereby implying that despite major political or commercial conflicts 
a basis exists for accommodation, a basic weakness of the neo­
classical approach, however, is that it does not capture the key
33aspect of the market, that is politics interactions.
According to M.A. Adelman^ in a recent work on the Economics of
the International Oil Industry, the instability of the oil market in
the past as well as at the present time is a direct result of the fact
that the oil market is in the grip of a clumsy group monopoly, the
cartel of the OPEC nations, which, he claims, is unable to make even
changes that would benefit the group as a whole because it must
3Sconciliate conflicting interests within the group. Ernest J. Wilson-’-' 
has analysed three economic models which describe the interactions of 
the oil markets and politics namely, the neo-classical economic 
paradigm, regime paradigm and public policy paradigm. He also 
discussed the strengths and weaknesses of each model and concluded 
that as yet no adequate model is developed and felt that it would be 
disastrous not to design an appropriate model which would be more
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historically rooted and more politically sensitive.3^
At this point it is perhaps appropriate to look briefly at the 
political issues surrounding the recent crisis in the market which 
mainly concerned the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the large 
non-OPEC oil producers especially Britain. The oil market has been 
flooded by new sources of oil from developed as well as developing 
countries which operated to displace the high demand for OPEC oil. As 
a result Saudi Arabia lost markets because it had assumed the role 
within OPEC of swing producer - adjusting its production level up and 
down to balance supply and demand in order to protect the price - 
under the OPEC celing system where each member was restricted to its 
"quota" of production. In practice, however, many of the poorer oil 
producing OPEC members found it necessary to undermine quota 
agreements because of their own individual financial demands, for 
example, the war between Iran and Iraq.
Saudi Arabia took decisions in the summer and fall of 1985 which
resulted in a change of its traditional conservative approach to
pricing, that is, official sales pricing, to a new approach called
'netback pricing' which assured its buyers of profits on each barrel
of crude bought. This led to overproduction, a strategy which it is
felt37 aimed at recapturing its lost markets though the Saudis' stated
aim was that it wished to scure and defend for OPEC a fair share in
the world oil markets by limiting production on a global basis. By
overproduction the Saudis hoped to drive prices downwards so as to
38
force non—OPEC producers, particularly the (J.K., to cut production . 
The U.K., on the other hand, repeatedly refused to support any OPEC 
policy of production control and was not prepared to agree to full
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cooperation with OPEC because, according to Mr A. Buchanan-Smith,^ it 
seemed difficult to envisage how that policy would be applied on the 
U.K. side of the North Sea and furthermore if production were cut jobs 
would be lost. Depressed oil prices followed the overproduction^ but 
the changes brought about by netback pricing allowed the Saudis to 
recapture the downstream end of the European oil market in which they 
had lost most market share. In the process they had directed 1.7 
million barrels a day of crude to refiners displacing North European 
spot priced crude and caused North Sea spot prices to plummet^. 
Whether the Saudi Arabian decision to overproduce was motivated by a 
desire to punish those OPEC membes who found it necessary to undermine 
quota agreements, or an attempt to force non-OPEC producer countries, 
especially Britain, to adopt production quotas, or to recapture 
markets it lost while acting as swing producer remains a matter for 
conjecture. Clearly, however, much of the blame for the fall in prices 
was attributed to the Saudis' decision to overproduce.
It is clear that the oil market has in recent times been 
characterised by an atmosphere of complex policies added to which it 
is not regulated along any predictable lines. Consequently the recent 
confrontation by Saudi Arabia and some large non-OPEC producers, 
especially the U.K., would certainly lead to further instability but 
it is doubtful whether the extremely low price fall was anticipated or 
even contemplated. In such a setting some of the oil companies claim 
that they are experiencing undue hardship because of the unprecedented 
low oil price fall. Undoubtedly, the price collapse would have 
affected the entire petroleum industry but the area of most concern is 
the legal arrangements governing the exploration and production 
phases. Depressed oil prices have led to high cost of exploration and
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production especially in the North Sea. This economic situation, the 
oil companies claim, is less than favourable to them and as a result 
have responded to the 'chaotic conditions' in the oil markets by 
scaling down expenditure. In the U.S.,4  ^ for example, two of the 
larger oil companies, Exxon and Chevron, are reported to have 
undertaken drastic policies of reduction of capital spending in 1986 
by a combined $4.3bn. Exxon planned to cut capital explortion 
expenditure by 26% in which expenditures for oil and gas exploration 
and production would be reduced by $2bn and spending on downstream 
refining and marketing operations by 21%. Chevron, Texaco and AMOCO 
have all announced major cuts to capital spending. In the U.K. 
British Petroleum has stated that capital expenditure will be revised 
downwards in 198648 while Britoil's cut in exploration expenditure 
will be 40% with future exploration under constant review and capital 
expenditure will be reduced by £40m.44 Burmah Oil, U.K.'s oldest oil 
exploration company, is to cease its activities as an offshore 
operation by selling some of its assets to Britoil and to cut its 
exploration budget by 50%.46 In Norway exploration planned for 1986 
has been postponed46 while Canadian oil producers have decided to cut 
spending by more than a third47 and it has been reported in Hamiltonm 
that worldwide exploration and production cuts could be as much as by 
50%.48
While the majors and those companies who have diversified 
earnings are able to survive the immediate contraction of their cash 
flow brought on by the fall in the oil prices and can look ahead to 
higher prices in the long term, the smaller companies without such 
economic prosperity will find it more difficult to fund future
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drilling programmes.^
As mentioned earlier, some oil companies operating in the U.K. 
sought to be relieved from drilling their "obligation wells". By 
making such a request they are in effect seeking renegotiation of the 
terms which were the bases upon which the licences, contracts were 
granted. To adopt the strict legal approach that the contract is 
binding without regard to the economic and political factors that 
combined to trigger the collapse in the price of oil could have some 
undesirable effects in the industry which may, to some extent, operate 
to defeat the very purpose of generating revenues for the host state. 
Bearing in mind that the petroleum contract depends on mutual benefits 
it is being argued that renegotiation of the contract to accommodate 
those companies which are most in need should form part of the 
contracting policies of the oil producer governments. In the following 
chapter issues relating to the recent trend of renegotiation of 
contracts generally and the U.K. law and practice specifically would 
be looked at.
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Chapter 3_
Force Majeure Concepts - Renegotiation Issues - 
U.K. Law and Practice
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The recent oil price collapse, according to some oil companies 
operating in the North Sea, has resulted in changed economic 
conditions causing undue hardships sufficient to admit changes in the 
contractual terms of the petroleum licences regarding drilling of 
wells in the exploration and production phase. In almost all 
agreements between host states and oil companies the obligation to 
drill exploratory wells within a specified period is a basic term of 
the contract. In the U.K. such obligation is a precondition to the 
grant of a licence to explore and exploit the oil^, that is, it forms 
part of a work programme agreed between the licensee and the 
Department of Energy prior to the award of the production licence 
which contains no provision for change regarding such obligation. 
Generally petroleum contracts are subject to the law of the host state 
in keeping with the theory of absolute sovereignty of states which 
contain elements of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and 
the New International Economic order. Therefore any legal issues 
regarding changed economic circumstances, force majeure, would have to 
be decided in the context of the law of the host state. It must be 
pointed out, however, that at present there exists no uniform set of 
rules regarding force majeure in changed economic circumstances in 
national legal systems nor in international practice thus the entire 
area is one of uncertainty. As a result the economic and legal 
consequences would vary in the different legal systems but in cases 
where a legal system recognises the concept of force majeure the
courts may revise the contract.
In civil law systems the concept of rebus sic stantibus (changed
circumstances) gives the injured party a right to seek changes in the
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contract where circumstances change to render performance more 
burdensome so that continued contractual liability appear an unfair 
hardship. However, this rule was later opposed by the rule that the 
will of the parties must prevail and must not be changed by the (courts 
therefore legal thinking regarding the concept of force majeure vary 
from country to country.^ "Hie remedy for non-performanoe in civil law 
systems is that the aggrieved party is entitled to specific 
performance. In French law force aiajeure is a feature of transnational 
contracts. Hie concept of contrats administratifs gives the government 
the freedom to alter contracts in the public interest but at the same 
time this feature of mutabilite is balanced by a requirement that such 
other changes be made in the contract as necessary to restore the 
original financial equilibrium between the parties. Under the doctrine 
of imprevision the state is required to help shoulder the burdens 
where unforeseen changes of circumstances (not necessarily brought 
about by governmental action) affect performance of the contract.^  In 
German law the concept of force majeure has no counterpart but 
overtime a formulation of a general principle on contract revision was 
accepted under the formula of a 'collapse in the foundation of the 
transaction*, which provides that an uncontrollable change in the 
circumstances surrounding the contract that leads to a fundamental 
disequilibrium in the contract and puts an undue burden on the party 
who had not anticipated and accepted the risk in the contract would 
justify an adaptation or termination of that contract. However, this 
principle is counterbalanced by the principle of binding force of the 
contract6 thus it is debatable whether circumstances such as the 
collapse in the oil price would justify changes in the terms of the 
work obligations under the German system.
45
The English position, on the other hand, is that liability to 
perform a contract is absolute and even if non-performance is not as a 
result of the fault on the part of the defaulting party he is liable 
for breach of contract.^ However, in limited cases the courts hold 
that a fundamental or radical change in circumstances may 'frustrate1 
the contract bringing it to an end® but where performance becomes 
economically burdensome as in the Suez Canal cases^ the Courts 
maintain that so long as performance remains possible, though possibly 
more difficult or expensive than originally anticipated the parties 
will be held to their bargain. When frustration occurs the contract 
ends and the remedy is monetary compensation and damages. Further, the
1 n
Libyan nationalisation casesxu which concerned the complex dispute 
regarding revocation of concessions by Libya makes it quite clear that 
English courts have no power to adjust the contract to unforeseen 
fundamental changes. The parties must agree to renegotiate.11
In international law the concept of force majeure in changed 
economic circumstances is less clear. The French law of contrats 
administratifs with its doctrine of imprevision has influenced many
legal systems1  ^examples are Belgium, Italy, Poland, Spain, Latin 
America. Additionally, the civil codes of some Arab countries, such as 
Iraq, Libya and Kuwait which contain explicit provisions enabling the 
courts to modify the contractual obligation to adapt it to new and 
unforeseen circumstances,1® have undoubtedly been influenced by the 
French law of contrats administratifs. However, the French approach 
cannot plausibly be said to be the basis of a law of contract between 
states and foreign nationals simply because its tenets have not been 
proved to be among those "general principles of law recognised by
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civilized nations"14. International tribunals have peristently refused 
to count the French law of contrats administratifs as among the 
principles of law recognised by civil nations as recently the decision 
in the Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co/California Asiatic Oil v 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic.15
If it is agreed, however, that in the final analysis the 
petroleum contract is little more than a mutual economic arrangement 
then modification of the contract with respect to drilling obligations 
in certain cases would not only be fair but in the long term would 
also serve to promote the desired goals of the host state by virtue of 
the continuation of the project. Modern international practice support 
the view that cooperation could combine stability with mechanisms for 
renegotiation, even of the drilling obligations in work programmes, 
when economic conditions change. It is being submitted that the 
British position that changed economic conditions rendering the 
contract regarding the work programmes more difficult and expensive 
than originally anticipated can only result in revocation of the 
licence, is not in accord with international oil industry practice. 
Such a position is an endorsement of the classical notion of the 
sanctity of contract which seems awkward in the context of legal 
arrangements in the dynamic petroleum industry.
Since the oil industry is one of economic importance to the host 
state as well as the oil companies both parties seek to clarify their 
positions in the contractual terms in the agreement by use of various 
types of clauses and these impact upon the performance of the 
contract. Stabilization clauses, as noted in the previous chapter, aim 
at ensuring the principle of the sanctity of contract but in view of 
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources the
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jur idicial effect of such clauses is doubtful thus modern practice has 
responded by the use of additional devices such as renegotiation 
clauses in which the parties agree, for various reasons, to a 
substantial material change in the contract. Situations constituting 
force megeure, used in its wider meaning to include events such as 
economic fluctuations, may either be ground for renegotiation of the 
contract or be ground for termination depending on the particular 
legal system. In the context of the oil price collapse the term force 
mag eure would imply that the drastic price fall was unforeseen and 
outside of the control of the oil companies thus rendering the 
drilling obligations more onerous and expensive causing undue 
hardships. It should be noted that hardship clauses are also employed 
in some petroleum agreements. These are basically the same as force 
me jeure regarding the events which may apply to them even though,
■j r
according to W. Peter a theoretic difference is that the aim of 
hardship clauses is the adaptation of the contract to the changed 
situation whereas force mageure clauses do not describe in detail the 
procedure to be followed and the type of adjustment to be reached. 
This proposition seems doubtful, however, in the light of the 
following extract of a force mageure clause contained in a 1977 
agreement.1"* It states:
"23. FOrce Majeure.
The obligations of each of the Parties —  other 
than the obligations to pay money, shall be 
suspended while such party is prevented —  from 
complying therewith by any cause beymid the 
reasonable control of such Party ... such Party
shall give notice of suspension ... stating the 
date and extent of such suspension and the cause 
thereof. [And] ... shall resume the performance of 
such obligations as soon as reasonably possible 
after the removal of the cause ..."
The idea behind the obligatory work programme is to accelerate 
the benefits of production when a potential petroleum field is to be 
explored*therefore the host state would wish to discourage the oil 
companies from delaying the work and using the licensed area for 
speculative purposes which would obviously delay the state's expected 
economic benefits. This is not to assume that the international 
practice is that once agreed upon the work programme and drilling 
obligations may not be reviewed and/or changed neither is it true that 
the overall control of the state over the exploitation of its natural 
resources is being undermined if provisions are included in the 
agreement to revise the drilling obligations. In an exploration and 
production sharing agreement between the Government of Qatar and
1 o
Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft and others (1976)-LO by Article 5 work 
obligations provided inter alia for exploration within the contract 
area during a specified period for the purpose of assessing the 
prospects of the area and the drilling of obligatory wells during a 
specific time. However, Article 10(2) gives the contractor a 
discretion to revise the exploration work programme as may be 
required by the circumstances" and to notify the government without 
delay even though "any major change" shall require the approval of 
both parties. The important features of this agreement is that it 
contains provisions for both revision and governmental supervision at
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the same time.
Problems may arise, however, if the state party is not convinced 
that the economic situation merits a change in circumstances 
sufficient to alter the contract and also if the renegotiation clause 
incorporates an undetermined trigger such as the use of the words 
'profound change in the circumstances' as appeared in the 1974 
Supplemental LAMCO Iron Ore Agreement in Liberia^ where the parties 
may consult together for the purposes of considering changes in the 
agreement as they see fit. However, W. Peter^ observes that in 
practice renegotiation has a wide scope so that market conditions 
could possibly give cause for renegotiation of the contract despite 
the existence of an undetermined trigger.
In the recent market crisis the oil companies' argument for 
renegotiation of the work programme can be based on the fact that 
recession and depressed prices have resulted in fundamental changes in 
the economic environment which affected the equilibrium of the 
agreement. Renegotiation provisions may well anticipate changes in the
work obligations since these are basic terms of the agreement. A
21recent petroleum agreement between Ghana and Shell (1974) has made 
provision for renegotiation in situations not unlike the recent oil 
price collapse. It states in part:
"[If] ... there should occur such changes in the 
financial and economic circumstances relating to 
the petroleum industry, operating in conditions in 
Ghana and marketing conditions generally as to 
materially affect the fundamental economic and 
financial basis of the Agreement then provisions
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... may be reviewed ... making such adjustments 
and modifications as may be reasonable having 
regard to the Operator's capital employed and the 
risks incurred by him ..."
Renegotiation clauses drafted as above are supportive of Thomas 
Walde's view22 that the notion of "sanctity of contract", a feature of 
the liberal economy of the last century, as a rigid distribution of 
risks of future unforeseen developments is giving way to a more fluid, 
less predictable notion of the agreement as an institutional and 
procedural framework of long-term cooperation. Such clauses represent 
an important indication of the practice regarding international 
contracts which recognise that the financial equilibrium must be 
preserved. In commenting on the effects of the recent price collapse 
on the international oil scene, Michel Pecquer, President of Elf 
Aquitaine2  ^ explained that exploration budgets must be cut and 
"governments are usually very understanding" and that the companies' 
object was to "maintain a proper financial balance".
According to the British law and practice amendment of the 
licence terms is not allowed once agreement has been reached. The 
drilling obligations in the work programme, according to general 
practice in the industry, represent an important consideration in 
awarding a contract and this is similar in the U.K. law and practice 
where the Department of Energy considers the work programme proposed, 
which is expressed in terms of the surveys to be carried out, and the 
exploration wells to be drilled in the initial period of the licence. 
The exceptions are cases where the production licence has been the 
result of a cash tender (for example, where certain blocks licenced in
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the fourth and eight rounds) where it is the practice not to specify 
any particular work programme. Once agreed with the Department of 
Energy this work programme becomes a part of the licensee's 
obligations. The Amending Regulations (1982)24 stipulate that 
production licences are to be awarded for an initial term of six years 
with an option subsequently to continue the licence in respect of "the 
continuing part" for a further term of thirty years.
Exercise of the option is subject to due performance of the work 
programme so that exploration drilling is a precondition to the 
petroleum production licence.^ Recent trends indicate that many 
developing countries' contracts contain some equivalent stipulations 
as principal terms of their contracts with oil companies. While 
primary exploration periods may vary^° the work programmes invariably 
consist either of a firm commitment to drill a certain number of wells 
before the end of the exploration p e r i o d ^  or a firm commitment of an
no
agreed expenditure.
The policy adopted by governments, no doubt reflective of the 
development of the right of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, has seen the exercise of as much control as possible over 
the drilling programmes with heavy and concentrated work programmes 
and this seems true of most of the modern contracts whatever name is 
given to them. The Indonesian production—sharing contract of 1977 with 
Per tarn ina/Conoco is an example. Among the principal provisions the 
exploration period was for 6 years plus 2 years., plus 2 years with 
the exploitation period being 30 years from the effective date of the 
contract; the expenditure for the work programme was $40.6 million 
over 10 years with a firm commitment of $15 million for the first
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three years.^
Different petroleum arrangements have their distinctive 
advantages and drawbacks and most co-exist with laws in which 
guidelines are present but basically the governments try to find the 
arrangement most suitable to their national picture. Therefore most 
producer governments have sought to make binding contracts for 
exploration and exploitation of their petroleum resources inter alia 
either by stipulating that a certain amount of wells be drilled, or, a 
firm commitment of cash to be spent at some defined stage of oil 
production. The question then is can the oil price collapse 
destabilize such contracts? Changes due to fluctuation of the market 
price of oil have often been negotiated or achieved outside the 
contractual framework, such as taxation, and most petroleum contracts 
reflect some form of accommodation in their tax regimes . Therefore 
when the market collapsed it was not surprising that oil companies 
successfully appealed for adjustment in the tax regime.
Generally revenues accrue to the host state from the oil industry
by way of royalties and tax. While the former is usually a fixed
charge the latter has taken many forms and is variable since it
operates as a charge on profits. In the U.K. this two-tier system of
industry transfers to the government has been described^ as "complex
in its conception as it is arbitrary in its effect as a charge on
profits". While the complexities of the British taxation system is
32 ■beyond the scope of this work an observation by Anthony Carty is 
well worth noting. He contends"^ that if taxation is based upon a 
supposed fair return upon capital invested it is possible to argue 
that the tax system is part of the contractual regime of mutual profit 
and if this is accepted then the further argument could be that the
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U.K. has merely entered into a contract with the oil companies to
extract oil at a very great speed in return for a very high level of
profit in order to satisfy the U.K.'s balance of payment difficulties.
This line of argument has been recently echoed by Peter K e l l n e r ^  who
explained that for decades the British economic growth has been held
back by balance of payment constraints which the oil revenues removed
for a 'brief, golden period1 but he lamented the fact that the Tories
did not implement aggressive expansionist policies designed, for
example, to re-equip British industry which he claimed would have
resulted in a stronger economy. This appears to be a restatement of
ISthe Labour position with respect to North Sea oil.
The U.K. licence controls over development and production are to 
be found in clauses 14 and 15 of the present model clauses-^ and these 
date back to 1976. It is from these clauses that the obligation to 
drill wells would emanate since the contract for work programmes would 
follow the guidelines laid down in these clauses. Model Clause 13(1) 
provides that the licensee should carry out his working obligations 
referred to as a "work programme" before the expiry of the initial 
term of the licence and by Section (6) where the licensee commits any 
breach or non-observance the Minister has power to revoke the licence 
by virtue of Model Clause 39(1). It has however been accepted that:
"the development and production decisions of the
companies could not be assumed always to coincide
with the depletion policy which might be dictated
37by the public interest."
The practice became significantly different from the legal
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stipulations if only because the government, though wishing to exert 
as much control of the extractive process, also recognised that its 
depletion policy must be sufficiently predictable in its operation so 
as not to undermine the bases on which the oil companies and the banks 
to which they look for finance, made their plans and entered into 
commitments.
Two elements of depletion policy, namely, development delay and 
production cut-backs, have always been of concern to the government 
and while initially the policy was strict in that no delay on 
development of fields was allowed under existing licences (namely 
licences granted under the first four rounds) later policy statements
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stresed the need for flexibility and in 1982 the government 
indicated that it saw no case in the foreseeable future for delaying 
any new field developments. Production cut policies were more precise 
with statements that no cuts would be made in production from fields 
found after 1975 under an existing licence until 150 per cent of the 
investment in the field had been recovered and that cuts would 
generally be limited to 20 per cent.39 It is submitted that these 
shifting policies of the government result in greatly increased 
burdens on the licensee and raise the question whether the extensive 
regulatory powers the govenment retains under the licence would not 
serve to undermine the notion that the licence is a contract in any 
strict legal sense. From an economic point of view it could be argued 
that such extensive powers may serve to undermine the profit
expectations of the oil companies.
The licence terms according to Model Clauses 14 and 15 stipulate 
that neither development nor production of petroleum can be carried 
out except with the consent of the Secretary of State in accordance
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with a development programme which he has approved. By Model Clause 
14(4) the Minister has a discretion to approve it, unconditionally or 
conditionally, or reject it. When he uses his discretion to reject it 
in the national interest there could be no arbitration (Model C. 14(4) 
(c) (ii)).
Once the Minister exercises his discretion and approves the 
development programme under Model Clauses 14 and 15 and its procedures 
if the licensee fails to carry out the work programme it would be 
considered a breach and ground for revocation of the licence provided 
he has had reasonable time to carry out such works.
One writer^ has pointed out that the current practice relating
to development programmes differs from what was intended by the 1975
Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act (U.K.). Model Clauses 14 and 15
set out a procedure for approving a development programme and for
regulating rates of production through the use of limitation notices.
The initial intention of the Department was to control production
through "approvals" which would presumably cover production from a
field during its entire life and the procedures for "consenting" to
operations under Model Clause 14(1) was intended as a "temporary
expedient" prior to the approval of a definitive programme. However,
the original intention was found by the Department of Energy to be too
inflexible and certain practical solutions were employed. For example,
in 1976, the Department decided to base production control on a system
of permitted field production rates within a range of plus or minus 5
per cent of the anticipated production forecast submitted by the
41licensee and approved by the Department.
Arguably, the effect of such an agreement is a whittling down of
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the force of the law because even a minor shortfall in the agreed 
rates of production contained in the work programme as agreed could 
lead to a breach and consequent revocation of the licence. In reality 
accurate forecasting levels of production for the whole life of the 
field is extremely difficult in the initial stages. However, the fact 
is that such a decision is a unilateral variation of the licence terms 
which is contrary to contractual principles.
The view43 has been put forward that the wording of Model Clauses 
14 and 15 allowed a construction that approvals can be granted with 
conditions attaching thus giving the Department of Energy ample room 
to manouvre and thus was able, with the consent of the offshore 
operators, to devise a procedure of "staged approvals". The first and 
second stages are normally of short duration covering the development 
up until full production is achieved at which time the field would 
have repaid its investors and made the substantive part of its
profit.43 The third stage approval covers the remainder of the
field's life and normally will be left open in order to preserve 
maximum flexibility without fettering away the discretion of the 
Secretary of State to approve or disapprove proposals which are 
contrary to the intents and purposes of the petroleum legislation.44 
At each stage of the approvals the Department is able to review the 
progress of the field by examining the information supplied by the 
licensee in the procedure of Annex A and Annex B forms. The
Minister, by Model Clause 39, has a discretion to revoke the licence
because Model Clause 40 excludes from arbitration
"... things to be determined, decided, directed,
approved or consented to by the Minister ...
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The foregoing brief comments on the licence regarding the 
contractual requirements for the development programme which includes 
drilling obligatory wells illustrate that, apart from emphasising its 
regulatory aspects, it does show some variation between what is stated 
in the law and what obtains in practice. This flexibility has been 
achieved in the U.K. not only in giving much discretionary powers to 
the Minister to alter the agreed terms of the licence but also in the 
use of legal terminology which is malleable enough to afford choices 
to be made in interpretation of the legislation. These 
characteristics, it is submitted, operate to expose the arbitrariness 
of the British licensing regime which seems most unusual in the 
context of British legal standards as well as its stance regarding the 
economic concepts to which it is committed.
With regard to the Minister's power to revoke the licence for
A C
breach of the work programme Daintith*0 is of the opinion that the
government would be cautious regarding its use of the power because
such a course would throw wide open the legality of those agreements
which the government has made with third parties, that is, those
financing major developments under licences. Since the licensee lacked
title to the oil in situ lenders tried to secure a charge or mortgage
on the licence interests in the field under development. According to
Daintith47, to facilitate financings the Minister may agree, under
seal, with the lenders to certain limiations on the exercise of his
powers under the licence, most obviously, the power of revocation. In
such a case the Minister would appear to have agreed to fetter
statutory powers set out in Schedule 2 of the 1975 Petroleum and
48
Submarine Pipelines Act. On the basis of the Amphitrite case , it is
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doubtful whether the courts would allow, under the petroleum 
production licence, any restraint on the exercise of governmental 
public policy that public bodies should not fetter the discretionary 
powers conferred upon them to exercise in the public interest.49 
However, Section 18 (5) (b) of the 1975 Act declares:
1 (b) any model clauses as incorporated in a licence 
by virtue of those provisions may be altered or 
deleted by an instrument under seal executed by 
the Secretary of State and the licensee."
Daintith^ argues that if by the above-quoted section the 
Minister is explicitly empowered to derrogate from his licence powers 
by agreement with the licensees, he may also do so by agreement with a 
third party, that is, the financers. Whether or not the question of 
fettering public powers arises any assertion by the present government 
that its carefully drawn agreements were invalidated by a legal flaw 
would severely damage its credit with the banking community in 
Daintith's opinion. The government would be prudent to avoid taking 
measures which could drive the companies to bankruptcy since 
insolvency of the licence holder may lead to revocation of the licence 
(Model Clause 39(2) (c)) which would in turn affect its security and 
raise questions concerning the legal status of the agreements made 
between the government and the licencee's lenders. It would seem 
therefore that it may be both in the government s and the banks 
commercial interest to keep the licence going so as to preserve the 
security.
By way of conclusion it must be stressed, however, that 
governments are not motivated always by the same private sector
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criteria and therefore if it is to encourage a policy of, for example, 
technology transfer, regional employment or defence industry base, 
they may act in a way that would be considered "inefficient" by the 
private sector. In other words, national interest can override and 
government can revoke the licence for failure to comply with the 
drilling obligations. The companies could then sue for damages if they 
can show damages in theory but it must be pointed out that some 
contracts may contain a limitation of liability clause so that the 
damages the companies may claim would be limited to the extent 
provided for in the contract.
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The recent oil price collapse has again raised questions 
concerning the nature of the oil company/host state relationship. The 
balance of power from the companies in the early concession regime 
shifted to the host states against a background of claims to permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and a new international economic 
order which resulted in changes in the legal regime between them. One 
writer-*- has commented thus:
"... In particular, international minimum standards 
of protection, with their emphasis on the 
interests of foreign investors, have given way, in 
part to norms of the national law of the host 
state, which emphasise the interests of the state 
subject to some protection of the legitimate 
expectations of the foreign investor."
It is being contended that the recent oil price collapse has 
demonstrated that in the complex and murky international oil industry 
another shift in the balance of power may occur giving increased 
rights to the foreign investors inter alia rights to renegotiate the 
work programmes in changed economic conditions so as to enable them to 
fully realise their profit expectations. The basis of this argument is 
that the petroleum agreement depends on the mutual economic benefits 
of both producer—states and oil companies. Changing circumstances in 
the oil industry brought on by economic or political considerations 
have always impacted on the legal regimes in the past. However, 
governments have generally been the beneficiaries of the theory of 
changed circumstances by claiming special governmental prerogatives as
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contracting parties and affirming rights to alter petroleum agreements 
in the public interest. It must be noted, however, that the petroleum 
agreement suffered alteration for even broader political objectives 
which at times can be unrelated to the purpose of the contract. By way 
of illustration one may recall the tense political situation in the 
Middle East in 1973 following the Israeli-Arab conflict in which the 
United States government support of the Israeli policies was the cause 
of much resentment in the Arab world. They were moved then to act 
unilaterally and inter alia to take over ownership of the operating 
oil companies.^
That changed circumstances should impact upon contractual 
commitments is generally accepted although the legal effect in the 
U.K. and common law systems would be termination of contractual 
obligations whereas in systems that follow the French law of contrats 
administratifs the legal effect is normally revision of the 
contractual obligations rather than termination.
Further, petroleum agreements are concluded against an extremely 
complex background where politics and economics and even social 
factors interact; where the oil market is unregulated; where the 
structure and organisation of the oil companies are constantly 
changing; and, where the policies of the major non-OPEC oil producers 
such as Norway and U.K. and those of the powerful OPEC countries 
impact as evidenced by the recent Saudi Arabian policy of 
overproduction which led to chaos in the industry. In such 
circumstances it is too simplistic to regard petroleum agreement as 
'contracts' in the strict classical legal sense - the complex nature 
of the industry has effectively rendered certain classical notions 
obsolete. For example, the concept of equal bargaining strengths of
69
the parties has never been applicable in the context of the petroleum- 
concession, more realistically the agreements were always 
characterised by shifts in bargaining power from the company to the 
host states. The recent oil price collapse may well see the reverse in 
so far as the companies may validly claim that international practice 
recognises that there should always be renegotiation of the contracts 
when economic circumstances change. Additionally, the idea of state 
participation has influenced the establishment of state enterprises as 
"the most appropriate vehicle for the implementation of state 
participation" according to one writer3, but apart from the obvious 
changes in the contract which this idea brought with it, the identity 
of the state as a party to the contract could at times be obscure and 
in addition pose many legal questions both at national and 
international levels.
In the wake of the recent oil price collapse it was widely 
reported4 that oil companies were responding to the situation by 
cutting expenditure on exploration. It is assumed that such cuts may 
have been in excess of what was agreed to in the work programmes 
therefore some companies operating in the North Sea, as reported 
could "drill only those well they have to drill". However, many 
companies were reportedly asking^ the Department of Energy to be 
relieved of the obligation to drill "obligation wells" and while the 
Department of Energy agreed in some cases it did not wish to encourage 
such practice. The companies in question would most likely be those 
without a solid stream of diversified earnings who would suffer a cash 
flow problem. The Energy Minister initially doubted7 whether the price 
fall would impact upon exploration contracts but later admitted8 that
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a number of companies had raised issues with respect to Advance 
Petroleum Revenue Tax and its effects on their cash flow and ability 
to fund existing and new developments in the U.K. continental shelf. 
However, he avoided^ making statements or discussing government policy 
towards development of North Sea oil. In November 1986, nevertheless, 
legislation was passed to provide for early repayments of Advance 
Petroleum Revenue Tax credits in 1987 with a view to assisting only 
those companies that suffered cash flow problems as a result of the 
collapse in prices. When the Minister refuses to allow the companies 
the opportunity to renegotiate the drilling obligation he is acting 
within the dictates of the British administrative legal practice and 
since the British legal system does not recognise that force majeure 
situations (used even in the context of changed economic 
circumstances) merit changes in the contractual obligations unless the 
parties have agreed to renegotiate, the companies do not have any 
legal rights because the work programmes cannot be renegotiated 
according to British petroleum law.
It seems therefore that the British government has no interest in 
agreeing in principle to renegotiate the work programmes to reduce 
exploration. It is submitted that if the British government accepts a 
legal right of the oil companies to renegotiate it would be held 
against them at a later date. This approach, however, is contrary to 
recent trends in the industry which tend to renegotiation when 
economic circumstances change in order to maintain the equilibrium of 
the contract. Companies are of the view that if economic circumstances 
change then they too should require a revision of existing agreements, 
in other words, renegotiation should work both ways.
There is evidence to support that in international practice the
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work programmes in a petroleum contract can be renegotiated in 
situations of changed economic conditions. While it is admitted that 
such practice does not have any legal force to restrict governments it 
does constitute evidence of what governments are prepared to accept 
which is that basically the petroleum contract depends upon mutual 
economic benefits. It is therefore being submitted that the British 
government should consider that it has a duty to renegotiate the work 
programmes in the same way as Third World governments and that the 
negative approach to renegotiation of the work programmes in changed 
economic situations is, to say the least, arbitrary and unsuited to 
the British capitalistic situation.
Finally, an approach recommended by one writer with regard to
mineral contracts may well be relevant in the context of the recent
12oil price collapse. She states:
"Solutions in the vast and complex field of 
international economic relations - if they are to 
last and to be successful - require the common 
support of all parties involved. The overall goal 
therefore must be to reach reasonable arrangements 
in each individual case for host country and 
foreign parties alike — securing the legitimate 
political, social and economic goals of the host 
country without frustrating reasonable 
expectations of the foreign partner.
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